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THE PARENTLESS CHILD’S RIGHT TO
A PERMANENT FAMILY
Joseph S. Jackson*
Lauren G. Fasig**

INTRODUCTION
Despite a twenty-percent reduction over the past decade, more
than 420,000 children in the United States remain in foster care,
1
and more than 110,000 of them are waiting to be adopted. These
children are frequently subjected to multiple placements and lack a
2
State adoption statutes typically seek to
stable environment.
achieve adoption for each of these children as promptly as possible,
based on an individualized home study and judicial determination
3
that the proposed adoption would be in the child’s best interests.
Some states, however, limit the pool of potential adoptive parents in
one way or another. Arkansas and Utah prohibit adoption by any
person cohabiting in a sexual relationship without the benefit of
4
marriage. Mississippi prohibits adoption by couples of the same
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The authors thank Nancy Dowd, Mark Fenster, Shani King, and Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse for their comments on an earlier draft. We specially thank
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, whose amicus work provided the foundation for
much of what we present here. We also thank Shelby Anderson and Rachelle
Bergeron for their excellent research assistance. In the interest of full
disclosure, we note that this Article expands on our work on an amicus brief
filed in support of adoptive children in Florida Department of Children &
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
1. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption—FY 2002–FY 2009, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb
/stats_research/afcars/trends.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
2. See infra notes 253–57 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8) (2010) (“The Legislature
recognizes that the best interests of the child require that the child be placed in
the most permanent living arrangement as soon as is practicably possible.”).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3)
(LexisNexis 2008). The Arkansas statute, which also prohibits foster care by
such persons, was declared unconstitutional in Cole v. Arkansas Department of
Human Services, No. 60CV-08-14284 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010), appeal
docketed, No. CV 10-840 (Ark. Aug. 12, 2010).
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gender. And Florida categorically prohibits adoption by gay men
6
and lesbians.
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services, the Eleventh Circuit rebuffed a challenge to Florida’s antigay adoption statute, asserting that the State has more latitude in
establishing adoption policies than in other contexts because it acts
7
“in loco parentis.” If the court means to say that the state has the
same discretion a parent would have to say what is best for the
child, that is surely wrong: parents can make decisions grounded in
sectarian religious beliefs or invidious notions of racial superiority
8
but the state cannot. Even apart from explicit constitutional bars
on particular forms of state action, however, the court is wrong to
suggest that the state has an unusually free hand in this area: to do
so overlooks the state’s constitutional duties to the parentless child
9
in its care.
What are those duties? Does the provision of minimally
adequate food, clothing, and shelter satisfy the state’s constitutional
10
obligations, or must the state go further to facilitate the child’s
11
The
development and “prepare him for additional obligations”?
answer, we submit, is that the state cannot merely provide the
physical sustenance necessary to keep the child alive, but must also
provide at least the minimum nurturing necessary to facilitate the
12
13
That
child’s development into an autonomous human being.
5. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2010).
6. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2010).
This statute was declared
unconstitutional in Florida Department of Children & Families v. Adoption of
X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
7. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
809–10 (11th Cir. 2004).
8. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984). Of course, even a
religious justification does not give parents carte blanche to do whatever they
please. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 170 (1944).
9. The court’s focus in Lofton was on the claims of prospective adoptive
parents, and its assertion was that the State’s concern for the welfare of the
adoptive child allowed it to classify prospective parents in ways that might be
impermissible in other contexts. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809–10. Although the
foster children in Lofton also asserted a claim to constitutional protection of
their foster family relationships, the court gave it no independent analysis,
asserting summarily that the children had no “fundamental right to be adopted”
and “no justifiable expectation of permanency in their relationships.” Id. at
811–12, 814. Disposing of a child’s claim to constitutional protection of family
relationships by assuming that the child’s claim merely mirrors the adult’s is an
error several courts have committed. See infra notes 268–76 and accompanying
text. For a more thoughtful analysis distinguishing the child’s interest from the
parent’s, see Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d at 98 n.19 (Salter, J., concurring).
10. “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody . . . the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989).
11. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
12. Autonomy is a psychological state that includes the ability to regulate
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obligation constrains the state’s choices in determining its foster
care and adoption policies.
Here, then, is our central thesis: an enduring attachment
relationship with a parent figure is essential to a child’s healthy
development into an autonomous adult. As developmental science
demonstrates, attachment relationships are foundational in the
formation of the self, critical to healthy psychological adjustment,
and necessary for the acquisition of self-regulation and social
14
In
competence, capacities essential to meaningful autonomy.
15
short, children need a permanent parent in order to achieve “the
ability independently to define [their] identity that is central to any
16
17
Accordingly, the parentless child has a
concept of liberty.”
fundamental right to a permanent family relationship, and laws
that interfere with the attainment of such a relationship must
survive strict scrutiny in order to pass muster. In particular, given
the unstable placements and repeated disruptions that typify foster
18
care in the United States, laws and policies restricting adoption
may require such scrutiny on the basis that they directly and
substantially interfere with the parentless child’s attainment of a
permanent family.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we demonstrate that

one’s own behavior and to select and guide one’s own decisions through
independence of thought, emotion, and action. Laurence Steinberg, Autonomy,
Conflict, and Harmony in the Family Relationship, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE
DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 255, 255–76 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliot eds.,
1990); accord Neil S. Binder, Note, Taking Relationships Seriously: Children,
Autonomy, and the Right to a Relationship, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1150, 1151 n.4
(1994) (“Autonomy, as used here, refers to the ability to respond in a critical and
self-reflective manner to the decisions that one is confronted with throughout
one’s life.”).
13. See infra Part I. This point follows directly from Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982), which holds that, in order to vindicate the liberty
interests of developmentally disabled persons in state custody, the Constitution
affirmatively requires the state to provide to such persons behavioral training
that is calculated to minimize the need for use of physical restraints.
14. See infra Part II.
15. By “permanent parent” we mean a primary caregiver who is attached to
the child in an enduring relationship that is expected to last throughout their
lives. As we explain in Part II, below, the child’s need for attachment to a
primary caregiver remains fundamentally important to healthy development
throughout the child’s maturation to adulthood.
16. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
17. All children, not just those without parents, need a permanent family
relationship, but when a parent’s constitutionally protected liberty interests are
also at stake they may be in tension with those of the child, suggesting that the
child’s rights in that context might be “substantially attenuated.” See Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 (1977).
Accordingly, we limit our claims concerning the child’s cognizable constitutional
rights to contexts in which no competing right of a parent is present. See infra
Part V.
18. See infra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
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the state has an affirmative constitutional duty to provide at least
minimally adequate nurturing to children in its custody, and we
explain how this duty accords with existing case law. Part II lays
out the developmental science, documenting the critical importance
of an enduring attachment relationship to the child’s development of
an autonomous self. Part III sets forth the specific constitutional
analysis establishing the child’s fundamental right to a permanent
19
family relationship. Part IV explains how this right constrains the
state’s choices in establishing foster care and adoption policies for
parentless children. Finally, Part V explores possible objections to
legal recognition of the child’s right to a permanent family
relationship, leading us to conclude that careful thought is needed
before that right is extended to contexts in which it conflicts with
the rights of parents.

19. While courts have yet to rule on the argument we present, the scholarly
literature expounds a number of related claims. The kernel of our thesis can be
found in Neil Binder’s note, Binder, supra note 12, at 1150–51. Related claims
are thoughtfully developed in James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The
State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755,
760–61 (2009) [hereinafter Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright]; Gilbert A.
Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children To Maintain
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 383–85 (1994);
David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships?
The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. REV. 891, 898 (2006); Mark
Strasser, Deliberate Indifference, Professional Judgment, and the Constitution:
On Liberty Interests in the Child Placement Context, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 223, 223 (2008); and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving:
The Child’s Fundamental Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297, 319–21
(2005). JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006),
provides a sustained philosophical analysis of the associational rights that
children should be deemed to possess, and James G. Dwyer, The Child
Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit
Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 410 (2008) [hereinafter Dwyer, The Child
Protection Pretense] grounds policy recommendations for child welfare systems
on a summary of the developmental science. For a somewhat contrary
perspective on the need of children in the child welfare system for a permanent
parent, see Sasha Coupet, Swimming Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making
the Case for “Impermanence,” 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 415 (2005). For additional
commentary in accord with our thesis, see Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of
Prevention: A Foster Youth’s Substantive Due Process Right to Proper
Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 383–84
(2005); Kyle Velte, Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented
Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 285–91 (2001); Tanya M.
Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the Bathwater: A Child-Centered
Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1
(2008); Cassandra S. Haury, Note, The Changing American Family: A
Reevaluation of the Rights of Foster Parents when Biological Parental Rights
Have Been Terminated, 35 GA. L. REV. 313 (2000); and Nicole M. Onorato, Note,
The Right To Be Heard: Incorporating the Needs and Interests of Children of
Nonmarital Families into the Visitation Rights Dialogue, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 491, 492–93 (2005).
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I. THE STATE’S DUTY TO CHILDREN IN CUSTODY
A. Youngberg v. Romeo and the State’s Affirmative Constitutional
Duty of Care
Constitutional requirements typically function as negative
20
rights. They prohibit governmental actors from usurping powers
21
beyond the scope of their authority and they protect individuals
22
rather than imposing
from certain forms of state action,
affirmative duties on the government to provide for the individual’s
23
Thus, “[a]s a general matter, a State is
protection and welfare.
under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
24
those within its border.”
However, when the government takes an individual into
custody, the Constitution requires that at least minimally adequate
25
provision be made to protect the individual’s safety and welfare.
26
This principle is well developed in the context of prison conditions
27
In
and extends as well to other forms of custodial confinement.
20. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 552 (3d ed. 2006).
21. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644–
45 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the limits of the President’s
wartime powers); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)
(stating that the Constitution “organizes the government and . . . assigns, to
different departments, their respective powers” and “establish[es] certain limits
not to be transcended by those departments”).
22. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting from government
infringement the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and assembly).
23. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) (stating that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on
the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security”); id. at 196 (“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid.”).
24. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
25. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200 (“[W]hen the State takes a person into
its custody . . . the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”); see also Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 317 (“When a person is institutionalized . . . a duty to provide
certain services and care does exist.”).
26. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981) (establishing the
proper analysis for determining whether prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (affirming a remedial
order addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Arkansas
prison system); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 n.17 (citing representative
cases); id. at 353–54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (summarizing the extensive
scope of litigation in lower courts). See generally William H. Danne, Jr.,
Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 51 A.L.R. 3d 111 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (suspect
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particular, it extends to children in state custody, not only when
28
they are confined in institutional settings, but also when they are
29
placed in foster care.
In all these contexts, the standard of care imposed by this duty
is not high. For prison inmates confined for the purpose of
punishment, it requires that the state not adopt a posture of
30
For those with
“deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s needs.

in police custody); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315–16 (patients at a state institution
for the mentally retarded); Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2004)
(involuntarily committed patient at a state-run drug rehabilitation facility);
Buffington v. Balt. Cnty., 913 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1990) (pretrial detainee);
Williams v. Nelson, 398 F. Supp. 2d 977, 986–87 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (patient at
state treatment center for sexually dangerous persons).
28. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (juvenile aliens in an
immigration detention facility); Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 95
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (minor participant in a juvenile independent living program);
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d
Cir. 2004) (minor detained in a juvenile detention center); Soc’y for Good Will to
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1243 (2d Cir. 1984) (minor
residents of state-operated schools for the mentally retarded); Santana v.
Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1183 (1st Cir. 1983) (minor in an industrial school and
juvenile camp); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974) (minor in a
state-run mental health hospital); Riddle v. Innskeep, 675 F. Supp. 1153, 1161–
62 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (minor at a juvenile rehabilitation center).
29. Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175 (4th
Cir. 2010); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Norfleet
ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993);
Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892–93
(10th Cir. 1992); Winston v. Children & Youth Servs. of Del. Cnty., 948 F.2d
1380, 1390–91 (3d Cir. 1991); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849
(7th Cir. 1990); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir.
1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc); Doe ex rel. Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
1981); T.M. ex rel. Cox v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2000);
Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Eric
L. ex rel. Schierberl v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.H. 1994); LaShawn A. v.
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel.
Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp.
1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting the emotional harm from multiple foster care
placements); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(discussing the separation of foster children from siblings); Doe ex rel. Johanns
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1172–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements); Wilder v. City of
N.Y., 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Braam ex rel. Braam v.
Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 856–57 (Wash. 2003); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. 1996).
30. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 326–27 (1986) (holding that the Due Process Clause affords no greater
protection to prison inmates than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause).
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mental illness or developmental disabilities confined in institutions
for their own protection, the standard is somewhat higher:
“professional judgment” must be exercised to provide appropriately
31
for their safety and welfare. Likewise, for children in foster care,
the better rule is that the “professional judgment” standard
32
Under either standard, government officials enjoy
applies.
substantial discretion in determining how the individual’s needs
33
should be met. Even where children are involved and there is no
offending conduct justifying punishment, the government is not
required to act solely on the basis of the child’s best interests:
considerations of cost and administrative efficiency also can be
34
taken into account.
The scope of this duty encompasses the individual’s basic needs
35
for “adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.” It extends
as well to protection from physical harm: the State “has the
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety” for persons confined
36
in its custody. And it has also been held to extend to protection
37
from psychological harm. Beyond this, whenever it is necessary in
31. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–23.
32. See Jordan v. City of Phila, 66 F. Supp. 2d. 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(noting that the professional judgment standard of Youngberg is the “proper
duty of care owed to a foster child”); LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 996 (holding
that liability is based on whether competent professional judgment is
exercised); Braam, 81 P.3d at 859–60 (holding that the appropriate standard of
care for foster children is the professional judgment standard); Kara B., 555
N.W.2d at 638 (stating that the duty of public officials to provide foster children
with a safe and secure placement is based on a professional judgment
standard). But see Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional
Standards for the State’s Duty To Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 385, 392 n.26 (1996) (describing the circuit split and noting
decisions applying a “deliberate indifference” standard). See generally id. at
399–410 (critiquing the application of the “deliberate indifference” standard to
the foster care context).
33. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
34. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993).
35. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
36. Id.
37. See K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848–49 (7th Cir.
1990); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that the
constitutional protection of personal security “includes both physical and
emotional well-being”); Andrea L. ex rel. Judith B. v. Children & Youth Servs. of
Lawrence Cnty., 987 F. Supp. 418, 423 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that the right of
foster children to be free from infliction of extreme psychological harm is “wellaccepted”); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (emotional harm in foster care); LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992–93;
Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009–10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (separation
of foster children from siblings); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (emotional harm from multiple foster care placements); Doe ex rel.
Johanns v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements as resulting in
emotional harm); Braam, 81 P.3d at 856–57; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 16–17 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the Eighth
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order to vindicate an identifiable interest in liberty, the state is
required to take affirmative steps to provide the individual in its
custody with nurturing, training, or education.
38
provides the doctrinal foundation.
Youngberg v. Romeo
Nicholas Romeo, a profoundly retarded twenty-six-year-old man
with the mental capacity of an eighteen-month-old child, was
institutionalized after his father died and his mother could no longer
39
take care of him. Unable to speak, lacking basic self-care skills,
and prone to violent tantrums, Nicholas was repeatedly injured
“both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to
40
him.” For his own protection and the protection of others, Nicholas
41
was routinely placed in restraints for prolonged periods of time.
His mother filed suit as his next friend, alleging that the conditions
of Nicholas’s confinement violated his substantive due process rights
42
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, she alleged that
Nicholas had constitutionally protected liberty interests in physical
safety, freedom of movement, and appropriate training or
43
“habilitation,” which the defendants had infringed.
The Court began by noting that Nicholas’s commitment did not
“deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the
44
Fourteenth Amendment.” As the State conceded, Nicholas had a
substantive due process right to “adequate food, shelter, clothing,
45
The question, then, was “whether liberty
and medical care.”
46
interests also exist in safety, freedom of movement, and training.”
Noting that both “the right to personal security” and the right to
“freedom from bodily restraint” are core liberty interests that even
incarcerated prisoners retain, the Court easily concluded that these
47
two interests “also survive involuntary commitment.” “If it is cruel
and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe
conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily
committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe
48
conditions.”
The asserted right to training or habilitation required more
careful analysis. If couched as a general “right to training per se,”
Amendment provides protection against “psychological harm [even] without
corresponding physical harm”); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that prisoners may maintain Eighth Amendment suits “grounded
solely on claims of psychological injury” in some circumstances).
38. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
39. Id. at 309.
40. Id. at 309–10.
41. Id. at 311.
42. Id. at 310.
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 315–16.
48. Id.
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calculated to enable those confined in state custody “to achieve
[their] maximum potential” or “to cope as effectively as their
49
“As a
capacities permit,” the claim would present difficulties.
general matter, a state is under no constitutional duty to provide
50
substantive services for those within its border.” And while “a duty
to provide certain services and care does exist” for those whom the
state confines in institutions, “even then a State necessarily has
considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its
responsibilities. . . . Nor must a State ‘choose between attacking
51
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’”
But the claim asserted by Nicholas was more limited. The
additional training and habilitation he sought—including training
in self-care skills—was “needed to reduce his aggressive behavior,”
and thus was related to his “constitutionally protected liberty
52
interest in safety and freedom from restraint.” Such training, the
53
Court held, was constitutionally required. Specifically, the Court
concluded that Nicholas’s “liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety
54
Because individual liberty
and freedom from undue restraints.”
interests are not absolute and must be balanced against relevant
55
state interests, the Court adopted a “professional judgment”
standard as the measure of the state’s constitutional obligation to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training: “In determining
what is ‘reasonable’ . . . courts must show deference to the judgment
56
In other words, “courts
exercised by a qualified professional.”
[must] make certain that professional judgment in fact was
exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
57
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.”
In the final analysis, then, the Court held that:
[T]he State is under a duty to provide [Nicholas] with such
training as an appropriate professional would consider
reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to
function free from bodily restraints.
It may well be
unreasonable not to provide training when training could
significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of
58
violence.

49. See id. at 318 & n.23.
50. Id. at 317.
51. Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970)).
52. See id. at 318.
53. See id. at 319.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 319–20.
56. See id. at 322–23.
57. Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir.
1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 324.
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Given “the kinds of treatment sought” by Nicholas in the case at
59
bar, the Court stated that it “need go no further.” Nevertheless,
the Court offered specific guidance for claims made in other
contexts:
A court properly may start with the generalization that there
is a right to minimally adequate training.
The basic
requirement of adequacy . . . may be stated as that training
which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and
the circumstances of the case. A federal court, of course, must
identify a constitutional predicate for the imposition of any
60
affirmative duty on a State.

The import of this language is clear. The state’s affirmative
duty to provide at least “minimally adequate or reasonable training”
61
is measured by the “identifiable liberty interests” at stake. For a
profoundly retarded person like Nicholas—for whom “no amount of
62
training will make possible his release” —the interests in safety
and freedom from bodily restraint define the scope of the state’s
obligation. But for those who, with appropriate nurturing and
training, can achieve release from confinement, the state’s
obligation is greater: it must provide nurturing and training
calculated to achieve that release. More generally, whenever any
individual liberty interest can be identified that requires nurturing
or training in order to be vindicated, the state is constitutionally
obligated to provide that nurturing or training for those individuals
confined in state custody who can benefit by it.
To begin with a pedestrian example, some children enter foster
care who, like Nicholas, “cannot talk and lack[] the most basic self63
If they never learn to speak, to feed and dress
care skills.”
themselves, to use the toilet, or otherwise to ensure their own wellbeing, they will be committed to state custody and institutionalized
64
Such confinement infringes their
as a danger to themselves.
65
identifiable liberty interest in freedom of movement. To avoid that
infringement, the state is constitutionally obligated to provide such
children the nurturing and training they need in order to learn to
take care of themselves.
Beyond the basics of self-care, children must develop certain
59. Id. at 319.
60. Id. at 319 n.25 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 319 & n.25.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Id. at 309.
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 393.11(8) (2009) (authorizing the involuntary
commitment to a residential facility of developmentally disabled or autistic
person who “lacks basic survival and self-care skills”).
65. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“This Court
repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”).
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psychological capacities in order to function in society as adults.
They must learn to regulate their emotions and behavior, or, like
Nicholas, their out-of-control emotional outbursts will likely lead to
67
injury from their own violence and others’ reactions to them.
Similarly, they must develop social competence, or their inability to
interact appropriately with others will likely lead to violent
interactions or isolation so extreme that it interferes with basic self68
Without the capacities of self-regulation and social
care.
competence, these children will likely present a danger to
69
themselves or others as adults, requiring institutionalization that
infringes their identifiable liberty interest in freedom of movement.
To avoid that infringement, the state is constitutionally obligated to
provide children in foster care the nurturing and training they need
to develop the capacities of self-regulation and social competence.
Apart from the interests in safety, freedom from bodily
restraint, and freedom of movement, individuals possess an
identifiable liberty interest in “an autonomy of self that includes
70
As the Court
freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”
affirmed in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, “the ability
independently to define one’s identity . . . is central to any concept of
71
Like the self-care skills and psychological capacities
liberty.”
discussed above, this ability does not materialize on its own, but
requires an appropriate nurturing relationship with a caregiver in
72
order to develop. Accordingly, the state is constitutionally required
to structure its foster care and adoption practices so as to provide
such a relationship for the children in its care.
In sum, while “adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical
73
care” are “the essentials of the care that the State must provide” to
children in its custody, these essentials do not exhaust the state’s
responsibilities. In addition, the state “has the unquestioned duty to
74
Beyond this, the
provide reasonable safety” for these children.
state must provide the training and nurturing necessary to develop
self-care skills, the psychological capacities of self-regulation and
75
social competence, and the “autonomy of self” that is “central to

66. See infra Part II.
67. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., § 393.11(8) (authorizing the involuntary commitment of a
developmentally disabled or autistic person who “lacks basic survival and selfcare skills” or “[i]s likely to physically injure others”); id. § 394.467(1)
(establishing similar criteria for the involuntary commitment of a mentally ill
person to a psychiatric facility for treatment).
70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
71. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (emphasis added).
72. See generally infra Part II.
73. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
74. Id.
75. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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76

any concept of liberty.”

B. Squaring the Implications of Youngberg with Existing Case
Law on the Constitutional Claims of Children in State Custody
The central claim asserted here—that children in state custody
have a substantive liberty interest in a secure and stable family
relationship, because such a relationship is essential in order for
these children to attain the capacities needed to function as
77
autonomous adults—has not been addressed by the courts.
However, a number of related claims have been considered.
Closest to the mark are cases like Braam ex rel. Braam v.
78
79
State and LaShawn A. v. Dixon, which, relying on the state’s
affirmative constitutional duties under Youngberg, sustained class
action claims of children in foster care who alleged that repeated
disruption of their placements violated their substantive due process
80
While their precise
right to be free from state-imposed harm.
rationales have differed, courts have consistently concluded that
Youngberg requires the state to protect foster children in its custody
not only from physical harm, but also from serious psychological
81
harm, including specifically the psychological and emotional harms
82
In
that repeated disruption of attachment relationships causes.
Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court made clear that this
constitutional obligation does not require the state to act solely out
of concern for the best interests of the child: “Minimum standards
must be met, and the child’s fundamental rights must not be
impaired; but the decision to go beyond those requirements . . . is a
83
Thus,
policy judgment rather than a constitutional imperative.”
the Court held, where their institutional custodial placements meet
minimal constitutional standards, children awaiting deportation
have no right to be released to the temporary custody of a non84
relative caregiver. Notably, however, the Court suggested that if
an appropriate permanent guardian or adoptive parent were willing
76. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
77. The claim was asserted in Florida Department of Children & Families
v. X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), but was not reached
by the court in its disposition of the case. See id. at 91.
78. 81 P.3d 851 (Wash. 2003).
79. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel.
Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80. See also B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(emotional harm from multiple foster care placements); Doe ex rel. Johanns v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements).
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992–93; B.H., 715 F. Supp. at
1394–95; Doe ex rel. Johanns, 670 F. Supp. at 1175–77; Braam, 81 P.3d at 857.
For a discussion of those harms, see infra Part II.D.
83. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993).
84. Id. at 304.
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and able to take custody, continued institutional confinement would
85
violate the child’s liberty interests.
As these cases confirm, laws that unreasonably prevent a
parentless child from attaining a permanent family relationship
implicate constitutional concerns, both by prolonging the child’s
86
confinement in state custody, and by exposing the child to serious
harm from the repeated detachments that typify foster care
87
throughout the United States. But the analysis in these cases is
incomplete because it overlooks the essential role a permanent
attachment relationship plays in the formation of personal identity
and the realization of meaningful autonomy. By focusing attention
on that role, the argument we present here supplements the
analysis in these cases and reveals an additional basis on which to
conclude that laws interfering with the attainment of a permanent
family relationship implicate the parentless child’s constitutionally
protected interest in liberty.
Other cases focus not on the state’s affirmative duties under
Youngberg, but on the constitutional protection afforded to family
relationships under the line of cases extending back to Meyer v.
88
89
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. For example, in Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, foster
parents relied on the importance of parent-child attachments to
press a claim for procedural due process protections before a foster
child could be removed from the home, arguing that foster families
have the same right to “the integrity of their family unit” as
90
The foster children did not join in that
biological families do.
claim, but in fact opposed it, arguing that New York’s existing
85. Id. at 303 (emphasizing that the persons offering to take custody in this
case were “unwilling to become the child’s legal guardian but [only] willing to
undertake temporary legal custody”); id. at 304 (stating carefully that the
Constitution does not require “nonadoptive” private custody to be substituted
for institutional care).
86. The “nature and duration” of a person’s confinement in state custody
must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of that confinement.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Because this principle extends to
the context of foster care, “[u]nnecessarily prolonged confinement in
government foster care invokes the substantive due process liberty interests of
foster children.” E.C. ex rel. Katz v. Sherman, No. 05-726-CV-W-SOW, 2006 WL
1307641, at *37 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2006); see also Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v.
Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that foster children
stated a substantive due process claim as to the duration of their placement in
foster care); G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 984 (Fla. 2008) (noting governmental
intrusion into family relationships in the context of foster care and legal
guardianship, as distinguished from the freedom from intrusion available in the
context of adoption).
87. See infra notes 241–46 and accompanying text.
88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
90. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842
(1977).
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procedures for removal of foster children appropriately served their
91
best interests. The Court discussed at length the foster parents’
claimed liberty interest in the integrity of their families, but
ultimately concluded that the existence of that interest did not need
to be resolved: “even on the assumption” that foster parents had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, New York’s procedures
92
were constitutionally adequate.
Likewise, Lofton involved a claim by foster parents and children
to a constitutional right of “family integrity” protecting the foster
93
The court rejected that
family relationships from disruption.
claim, concluding that state law gave foster parents no justifiable
expectation that their family relationships would be protected from
94
disruption. Because the foster parents had no right to adopt, the
95
court assumed that the children had no right to be adopted.
In contrast to the claims made in Smith and Lofton, our
argument here is not that foster families have a constitutional right
96
to “the integrity of their family unit.” We assert a right of children
not to constitutional protection of their temporary foster care
arrangements, but to constitutional protection of their interest in a
permanent family.
Other court decisions addressing a child’s claimed right to
maintain important family attachments have arisen in contexts
where the child’s claim stands in tension with the rights of a
custodial parent. In Troxel v. Granville, grandparents sued under a
state statute that allowed a court to order visitation based simply on
97
a “best interest of the child” standard. Though the mother had not
completely severed the child’s ties with the grandparents, the court
below ordered additional visitation, giving no weight or deference to
98
A plurality of the Court held that the
the mother’s decision.
statute as applied violated the mother’s substantive liberty interest
in directing the upbringing of her child: “[T]he Due Process Clause
does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
99
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”
Michael H. v. Gerald D. also involved a relative’s effort to

91. Id. at 839.
92. Id. at 847.
93. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
809–15 (11th Cir. 2004).
94. Id. at 814.
95. Id. at 811–12. As noted above and discussed more fully below, the court
was wrong to make this assumption. See supra note 9; infra notes 268–77 and
accompanying text.
96. Smith, 431 U.S. at 842.
97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (plurality opinion) (quoting
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
98. Id. at 71–72.
99. Id. at 72–73.
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preserve a relationship with a child over the objections of the child’s
100
custodial parent. In Michael H., a woman married to one man had
a child fathered by another, whom she and her daughter lived with
101
The biological
for a time before she reconciled with her husband.
father sued to establish paternity and gain rights of visitation, but
was precluded by a California statute that conclusively presumed
102
the husband to be the father of a child born in wedlock. The Court
upheld the statute over the substantive due process claims of the
biological father and the daughter, who also sought to preserve the
103
Five of the justices recognized the father’s
relationship.
substantive due process claim, but Justice Stevens joined the
plurality in upholding the statute, reasoning that the statutory
scheme gave the father an opportunity to obtain visitation rights by
establishing that visitation would be in his daughter’s best
104
interests.
As discussed more fully in Part V, Troxel and Michael H. are
grounded in appropriate concern for the right of a custodial parent
to direct the upbringing of her children—a concern that is
completely absent when parental rights have been terminated and
the child is in the custody of the state. These cases, therefore, pose
no obstacle to recognition of a parentless child’s fundamental right
105
to a permanent family relationship.
II. THE ROLE OF ATTACHMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON
In order to grow into a self-sufficient, autonomous individual,
capable of at least minimal functioning in society, each of us must
develop a number of capabilities by the time we reach adulthood.
Those capabilities cluster into three domains: self-regulation, social
106
These domains are not
competence, and the ability to learn.
independent, but rather operate together to support success in all of

100. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113–16 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
101. Id. at 113–15.
102. Id. at 115–16.
103. Id. at 128–31; id. at 136 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 136.
105. Indeed, close analysis of the Troxel opinions suggests that the case
affirmatively supports constitutional recognition of children’s interests in
maintaining family relationships. See Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due
Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 100–11 (2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking
About Children’s Rights in Judicial Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36
FAM. L.Q. 105, 112–14 (2002).
106. For a thorough explanation of the concepts discussed in this paragraph,
see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 89–217
(Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000) [hereinafter NEURONS TO
NEIGHBORHOODS].
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the tasks of human functioning.
Within the domain of selfregulation, the child must master the regulation of emotion,
108
Each of these serves as the foundation
behavior, and attention.
for more advanced functioning that comes with the increasing
demands of childhood, eventually yielding self-control, selfawareness, and independent functioning, the hallmarks of the
109
Additionally, every child must develop
autonomous individual.
social competence, which includes the ability to communicate with
110
These skills are
others and the ability to form relationships.
essential to existing in the inherently social environment of human
111
In this
societies. Finally, each child must be able to learn.
context, learning includes not only acquiring new information and
solving problems, but also developing the ability to adapt to
changing environmental input and demands. The interdependence
of these three domains is easy to see. For example, the ability to
learn is clearly necessary for developing self-regulation and social
competence, and the abilities to regulate attention and to
communicate are essential to learning and adaptability.
More than six decades of research confirms that attachment
relationships in childhood are necessary for the development of
112
these capabilities. Starting in the late 1930s, numerous child care
professionals in the United States and in Europe noted a disturbing
trend of children, many of whom had been raised in institutions,
who appeared to have no concern or feeling for anyone but
113
Many were withdrawn and isolated, while others
themselves.
114
By the time they were
were overactive and abusive toward peers.
115
teenagers, they had histories of criminality and violence. At about
the same time, John Bowlby reported that children who had been
separated from their parents during World War II were depressed or
otherwise emotionally disturbed, and mentally immature. The
107. Id. at 121.
108. Id.
109. Ross A. Thompson & Rebecca Goodvin, The Individual Child:
Temperament, Emotion, Self, and Personality, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 427,
427–61 (Marc H. Bornstein & Michael E. Lamb eds., 6th ed. 2010).
110. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 163.
111. See id. at 125.
112. See, e.g., Lisa J. Berlin & Jude Cassidy, Relations Among Relationships:
Contributions from Attachment Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF
ATTACHMENT 688, 688–712 (Jude Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 1999);
Michael E. Lamb & Charlie Lewis, The Role of Parent-Child Relationships in
Child Development, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 469–517;
Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 414; Dwyer, The Child Protection
Pretense, supra note 19, at 415–35; Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separation and
Reunification: Using Attachment Theory and Research To Inform Decisions
Affecting the Placements of Children in Foster Care, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring
2004, at 1.
113. JOHN BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 33–34 (1953).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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orphaned children tended not to develop normal emotional
connections to others, a characteristic shared by the
116
Bowlby’s research with these groups
institutionalized children.
captured the children’s extreme reactions to disruptions of their
attachment relationships, including fearful expressions, angry
protests, desperate searching behaviors, sadness, despair, and over
time, detachment, subdued physical activity, and subdued emotional
117
expressiveness.
On the basis of these observations, René Spitz conducted the
now classic studies exploring how the lack of adequate caregiving
118
His research documented that in spite of
affects development.
receiving good physical care, children who received little or no
emotional and social interaction with a regular caregiver were
119
generally sickly, and both physically and cognitively retarded.
Research in this area blossomed and spread from observational
studies of children to experimental work with monkeys. Harry
Harlow conducted the famous rhesus monkey studies, in which he
reared infant monkeys in isolation from birth, comparing their
120
development to that of monkeys raised normally by their mothers.
The isolated monkeys showed severe behavioral disturbances when
finally placed with other monkeys, such as compulsive self-biting,
121
To examine the psychoanalytic claim
rocking, and aggression.
that infant attachments were based on the provision of food by the
mother, Harlow conducted further research in which he removed
infant monkeys from their mothers and placed them with one of two
122
The “wire cage mother” was made only of wire, but
surrogates.
delivered food and water. The “terrycloth mother” was covered with
soft material that might offer comfort but delivered no food. The
infant monkeys with “terrycloth mothers” spent significantly more
time clinging to and close to the surrogates than did infants with
123
These infants would take sustenance and
“wire cage mothers.”
124
then move away from the surrogates. This research demonstrated
that contact comfort was more important to the infant monkeys’

116. See id. at 36–38.
117. Roger Kobak, The Emotional Dynamics of Disruptions in Attachment
Relationships, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 21–43.
118. Robert N. Emde, Individual Meaning and Increasing Complexity:
Contributions of Sigmund Freud and René Spitz to Developmental Psychology,
in A CENTURY OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 203, 218 (Ross D. Parke et al.
eds., 1994). To view examples of this work, see Videotape: Psychogenic Disease
in Infancy (René A. Spitz 1952), available at http://www.archive.org/details
/PsychogenicD?start=659.5.
119. Emde, supra note 118, at 218.
120. ROBERT SIEGLER ET AL., HOW CHILDREN DEVELOP 415–16 (2d ed. 2006).
121. Id.
122. Harry Harlow, The Nature of Love, 13 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 673, 674–76.
123. Harlow, supra note 122, at 676–77.
124. Id. at 676.
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attachment than was receiving life-sustaining food and water.
Attachment theory and its corresponding field of research grew
out of this early work, leading ultimately to a vast body of scientific
research documenting the critical importance of at least one warm,
sensitive, continuous relationship with a caregiver to children’s
126
This child development research
successful development.
overwhelmingly shows that children form strong bonds of
attachment to their parents early in life, which strengthen and
127
develop as children grow older. These attachment relationships do
not depend on biological connection, but form with any adult who
“on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s
128
psychological needs, as well as the child’s physical needs.”
Attachment relationships “shape the development of self-awareness,
social competence, conscience, emotional growth and emotion
129
regulation, learning and cognitive growth.” They “engage children
in the human community in ways that help them define who they
are, what they can become, and how and why they are important to
130
In short, children need the attachments that form
other people.”
in a secure and stable family relationship in order to develop into
autonomous, socially responsible, psychologically well-adjusted
131
Indeed, courts have long recognized that “children require
adults.
secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their
132
parents or foster parents.”
A.

The Formation of Attachments in Infancy

Developmental scientists define an attachment relationship as a
133
specific, enduring emotional bond between two individuals.
Infants and young children become attached to the individuals who
establish with them a pattern of consistent, predictable responses to
134
Attachment relationships appear to be
their signals and needs.
125. Id.
126. See generally HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112; ROBIN L.
HARWOOD ET AL., CULTURE AND ATTACHMENT: PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHILD IN
CONTEXT (1995).
127. See, e.g., 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 260, 350 (2d ed. 1982).
128. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 98
(2d ed. 1979).
129. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 265.
130. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, Young Children
Develop in an Environment of Relationships 1 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the
Developing Child, Working Paper No. 1, 2004).
131. Goldsmith et al., supra note 112, at 1–2.
132. Lehman ex rel. Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency,
458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982).
133. See generally Jude Cassidy, The Nature of the Child’s Ties, in
HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 3, 11–14; Lamb & Lewis, supra
note 112, at 469–80.
134. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 475–76.
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biologically based and to have evolved to provide protection for the
135
virtually helpless young human.
The infant “appears to be so
strongly motivated and prepared to develop attachments . . . that,
given the opportunity to interact regularly with even a modestly
responsive caregiver, he . . . will develop an emotional tie to that
136
person.”
Although the infant is predisposed to form attachment
relationships, the relationship is shaped by the environment of
137
138
Healthy or secure attachments between children
caregiving.
135. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 230.
136. Id.
137. JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT 166 (1969);
Cassidy, supra note 133, at 6. See generally Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb,
Using Child Development Research To Make Appropriate Custody and Access
Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297 (2000).
138. Attachment theory classifies an individual’s attachment status
according to four categories: secure; insecure/avoidant; insecure/resistant; and
disorganized. BARBARA M. NEWMAN & PHILLIP R. NEWMAN, DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH LIFE: A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 153 (9th ed. 2006); Nancy S.
Weinfield et al., The Nature of Individual Differences in Infant-Caregiver
Attachment, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 68, 68–69. The
pattern of interactions between the child and caregiver reveals the underlying
character of the attachment. The four attachment classifications describe the
child’s perception of the availability of the caregiver in times of need and the
organization of the child’s responses to the caregiver given those perceptions of
availability. See NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra, at 153.
Secure attachments are those in which the child is able to rely on the
caregiver as an available source of comfort, but is also comfortable to explore
the world away from the caregiver and develop mastery of the environment; the
child’s confidence in the sensitivity and responsiveness of the caregiver
engenders confidence in his own interaction with the world. See Weinfield et
al., supra.
Children with insecure/avoidant and insecure/resistant attachments have
not experienced consistent availability, responsiveness, and sensitivity to needs
from caregivers. Caregivers of children with insecure/avoidant attachments
seem to reject their children, spending less time holding, soothing, and
interacting with them. The children’s attempts to interact may be met with
indifference or rebuke. In times of stress, children with insecure/avoidant
attachments tend to avoid the caregiver and often fail to seek comfort or
assistance.
These children are also less likely to actively engage the
surrounding environment. See NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra.
Children with insecure/resistant attachments to caregivers alternate
between clinging to the caregiver for comfort and pulling away from the
caregiver in anger. Caregivers of insecure/resistant children tend to be
inconsistent in their responsiveness to the child, sometimes ignoring clear
signals of need and other times intruding upon the child to make contact,
appearing to interact with the child based solely on their own needs rather than
in balance with the needs of the child. Id. Because children with both
insecure/avoidant and insecure/resistant attachments are not able to explore
their environments without worry, they cannot achieve the same self-confidence
and mastery of the environment as securely attached individuals. Weinfield et
al., supra, at 69–70.
The fourth category of attachment status, disorganized attachments, is
that in which the child has no consistent way of coping with stress. The child’s

W03_JACKSON

20

3/16/2011 8:26:07 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

and their caregivers are formed when the care received is sensitive,
139
warm, and responsive.
Through regular interaction with her
caregivers during the first months, the infant learns three key
principles that serve as the foundation of the attachment
140
First, the infant learns that in social interactions,
relationship.
141
The child
partners take turns acting and reacting to each other.
comes to understand this concept of reciprocity through the give and
take experienced as the caregiver engages the infant in smiles,
142
For
talking, and other various interactions during routine care.
example, in response to the caregiver’s overtures, the infant gurgles,
smiles, or waves an arm, leading the caregiver to react with
143
additional communication efforts.
Second, the infant learns that her behavior can affect the
144
Time after
behavior of others in consistent and predictable ways.
time, crying brings the caregiver to her side and leads to satiated
hunger. Babbling results in smiles and talking from the caregiver.
This initial understanding of agency leads to the third principle,
145
Through repeated interactions, the infant learns that the
trust.
146
caregiver “can be counted on to respond when signaled.” The child
comes to expect certain patterns of response from the caregiver, and
147
This knowledge leads to
each response reinforces the expectation.

behavior is contradictory and often unpredictable, seeming to convey feelings of
extreme fear or utter confusion in relation to the caregiver. Caregivers of
children with disorganized attachments tend to be either negative and hostile
toward their children or passive, seeming to be afraid of their children, or
untrusting in their own ability to care for them. See NEWMAN & NEWMAN,
supra, at 153–54. Children with disorganized attachments are also less likely
to explore and master the world around them. See Jay Belsky et al., Instability
of Infant-Parent Attachment Security, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 921, 921–24
(1996).
139. The relationship between the development of healthy attachments and
parental care that is more affectionate, more effective in soothing the child, less
intrusive, and more sensitive to the child’s needs has been established in
numerous cultural groups and across numerous studies. See, e.g., MARY D.
SALTER AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT 137–53 (1978); Marianne
S. De Wolff & Marinus H. van Ijzendoorn, Sensitivity and Attachment: A MetaAnalysis on Parental Antecedents of Infant Attachment, 68 CHILD DEV. 571
(1997); Byron Egeland & Ellen A. Farber, Infant-Mother Attachment: Factors
Related to Its Development and Changes over Time, 55 CHILD DEV. 753 (1984);
German Posada et al., Through Columbian Lenses: Ethnographic and
Conventional Analysis of Maternal Care and Their Associations with Secure
Base Behavior, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 508 (2004).
140. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 473.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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a fundamental trust on which the attachment relationship is built.
The rhythm of interaction established as the infant learns
reciprocity, agency, and trust is an important component of the
attachment relationship, creating consistency in the child’s
environment over time and contributing a source of familiarity and
comfort that continues even when the interactions between child
149
and caregiver evolve with the child’s development. This rhythm of
150
interaction remains important throughout the child’s life.
Although the interaction style in the attachment relationship
may remain consistent, attachment behaviors differ across the
various stages of development.
Attachment in infancy looks
different than attachment in elementary school. One way to
measure the health or security of attachment relationships at any
developmental stage is to evaluate the degree of trust a child
151
This view of
develops in the reliability of specific people.
attachment is particularly appropriate as the child moves past the
early years of total dependence on others and into the more
independent developmental phases of the preschool years and
beyond.
In healthy attachment relationships, the caregiver’s
152
Over time, this
response consistently meets the child’s needs.
continuous and predictable responsiveness, behavior modeling, and
nurturing enable the child to thrive across all domains of
development and provide the basis for the child’s understanding of
153
human interaction. Even when the caregiver input is less optimal,
contributing to less healthy attachment relationships, the child
154
In such
learns a basic template of how relationships work.
situations, the child may learn that the caregiver is predictably
155
Still, these
unavailable, or even predictably unpredictable.
relationships form the child’s basis for understanding human
relationships and what it is to be a person.
B.

The Role of Attachments in the Emergence of the Self

The developing attachment relationship spurs the creation of
neurological pathways in the child’s brain that lead to psychological
156
Every
advances, including the emergence of a sense of self.
157
These
experience causes an electrochemical reaction in the brain.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 472–73.
150. See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
151. Lamb & Lewis, supra note 112, at 473.
152. Id.
153. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 236.
154. See id. at 241.
155. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (describing different
categories of attachment relationships).
156. See Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 427, 447–52.
157. See Geraldine Dawson et al., The Role of Early Experience in Shaping
Behavioral and Brain Development and Its Implications for Social Policy, 12
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reactions stimulate the neurons involved, leading to neuronal
158
growth and strengthening.
Thus, through experience, connections
between neurons in the brain are formed. Repeated experiences
159
lead to pathways that are strengthened with each occurrence.
These pathways join together to form networks of neuronal
connections, creating the hardwiring of brain functioning.
Attachment relationships are the major environmental factor—the
“active ingredient” in the environment—that shapes the
development of the child’s brain during its period of maximal
160
When a caregiver provides a pattern of consistent,
growth.
predictable responses to the child’s signals and needs, forming an
attachment relationship, the repeated experiences generate robust
neuronal connections in the developing child’s brain. In short,
healthy “development of a child’s brain architecture depends upon
161
the establishment of [attachment] relationships.”
As the baby gains more experience and builds understanding of
reciprocity, agency, and trust, the child’s expectations solidify into a
model that can be used to predict the behavior of others and to
understand new experiences. These models are talked about in
162
behavioral science as internal working models.
An internal working model serves two functions. As described
above, the model lets the child know what to expect from her
163
Additionally, the internal working model
attachment figures.
164
At
shapes the child’s understanding of and feelings about herself.
the same time that the child develops expectations about behaviors
and responses from the caregiver, she develops expectations about
165
So for example, the toddler
her own behaviors and preferences.
who tries kicking a soccer ball receives praise from the caregiver for
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 695, 697 (2000) (explaining the role of chemical
reactions in the brain, how memories are formed, and how neuronal growth
reinforces those developments).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 697–98.
160. NAT’L SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, THE SCIENCE OF
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 6 (2007), available at http://developingchild
.harvard.edu/index.php/download_file/-/view/67/.
161. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1.
162. Internal working models are the child’s mental representations of the
relationship between the child and the caregiver, based on shared experiences.
The model governs the ongoing attachment relationship, in that the child
interprets and predicts the caregiver’s behavior, thoughts, and feelings based on
his or her established patterns of interaction. This consideration of the
caregiver’s behavior, then, serves to support and regulate the child’s own
behavior. Internal working models are continuously under revision as new
experiences with the caregiver are added to the model. Inge Bretherton &
Kristine A. Munholland, Internal Working Models in Attachment Relationships,
in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 89, 90–91.
163. See Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 414.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 414–15.
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the effort, leading the child to repeat the behavior. Ongoing
feedback from the caregiver providing praise, advice, and even
participation as the caregiver kicks the ball back to the toddler leads
the child to seek to play with the soccer ball. The caregiver may
begin to talk about the child’s love for soccer with the child and
others in the child’s environment, labeling the child as a “soccer
player.” Over time, the child comes to think of himself as a soccer
player and as someone who loves soccer.
In addition, many of the child’s abilities are mastered within
early social relationships, structured and supported by the
caregiver. With experience, these abilities emerge as capacities of
166
For example, a two-year-old may grab her toy cat from
the child.
her older brother while slapping him in frustration. The father
takes her hand and explains the rules about sharing, hitting, and
asking for the things that she wants. The next time she tries to
claim a valuable item from her brother, the father reminds her of
the rules and helps her to ask for the toy rather than grabbing it.
Each time a similar scenario occurs, the father helps her to
remember the rules and to comply, over time allowing and expecting
the child to be better able to independently remember and to act on
the rules. Eventually the child responds to her brother’s snatching
of her toy by inhibiting the urge to take it back and instead asking
for its return. The child has now developed the ability to regulate
her own behavior in social interactions, an essential skill for
mastering social competence. The child is also able to generalize
this response pattern to other situations with other people. This
new capacity is added to the child’s internal working model,
elaborating her understanding of herself and how relationships
167
function.
Accordingly, there is first an organized relationship with the
caregiver; this organization, then, serves as the foundation for the
168
In this way, ongoing feedback from the
organization of the self.
caregiving environment further refines the child’s understanding of
how others see her, expectations held by others regarding her
169
behavior, and her own expectations, abilities, and feelings.
The parent-infant attachment thus provides “a crucial
foundation for the growth of healthy self-regard, because of its
170
influence on the young child’s developing self-representations.”
Through such a relationship, parental values, expectations, and
beliefs are transmitted in ongoing feedback about behavior, and this
166. L.S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN SOCIETY 70–72 (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1981);
see also NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 113 (discussing this
process in the context of children’s development of emotional self-regulation).
167. Bretherton & Munholland, supra note 162, at 89.
168. See generally Louis W. Sander, Infant and Caretaking Environment, in
EXPLORATIONS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY 129 (E. James Anthony ed., 1975).
169. Thompson & Goodvin, supra note 109, at 450.
170. Id.
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feedback strongly influences children’s self-representations.
Over
time, these patterns of beliefs, attitudes, expectations, and
172
Although this
behaviors emerge as the child’s own personality.
process occurs during the preschool years, the person the child is to
be continues to develop, adding to the complexity and organization
of the internal working models of self and other throughout
173
The emergence of autonomy in late adolescence is
childhood.
174
Just as
associated with the child’s attachment relationships.
attachments in infancy provide the child with a secure base from
which to explore the environment with the knowledge that the
caregiver will be available to help and comfort when needed, healthy
attachment relationships in adolescence support continued closeness
175
Caregivers
while encouraging the expression of differences.
facilitate identity exploration through an open exchange of ideas
176
and an appropriate level of challenge. “Attachment experiences”
177
are thus “vital in the formation of the person.”
C. The Ongoing Importance of Attachments to the Child’s
Development of Self-Regulation, Social Competence, and Ability To
Learn
It is not just the character of the early attachment relationship
that shapes later development; the ongoing nature of the parentchild relationship is fundamental to adult outcomes. Research now
indicates that children vary significantly in whether early
attachments have an enduring impact on their development, and it
is the continuity of caregiving and interaction style between parent
and child in the attachment relationship that shapes later
178
For example, a secure attachment in
developmental outcomes.
infancy does not predict more positive social functioning when the
mother’s interaction style has changed from warm and supportive to
179
However, when parents interact
insensitive and intrusive.
171. Id. at 451–52.
172. See L. ALAN SROUFE ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON: THE
MINNESOTA STUDY OF RISK AND ADAPTATION FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 25–27
(2005).
173. See Robert S. Marvin & Preston A. Britner, Normative Development:
The Ontogeny of Attachment, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at
44, 62–63.
174. See Ross A. Thompson, The Legacy of Early Attachments, 71 CHILD DEV.
145, 146 (2000).
175. Id. at 148–50.
176. Karen M. Best et al., Predicting Young Adult Competencies: Adolescent
Era Parent and Individual Influences, 12 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 90, 107–09
(1997).
177. L. Alan Sroufe, Attachment and Development: A Prospective,
Longitudinal Study from Birth to Adulthood, 7 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 349,
365 (2005).
178. See Thompson, supra note 174, at 145–51.
179. See generally Martha Farrell Erikson et al., The Relationship Between
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sensitively and warmly with their children not just in infancy but
also throughout childhood, the children are likely to develop
180
favorably.
Attachment relationships serve the primary function of
181
As the child
organizing behavior during the child’s infancy.
develops and the environmental demands on the child change, the
functions of the attachment relationship change as well. For the
toddler who is faced with the tasks of learning to seek goals and
handle new-found abilities such as expressing feelings and desires,
interaction with attachment figures provides assistance in
managing the tension that arises between these skills and safety
182
A responsive mother helps the frustrated
and social demands.
toddler to manage the emotions that might lead to a tantrum, and to
instead persist in working toward the goal, channeling the emotion
and energy into a strategy to succeed. Thus, the attachment
relationship provides the toddler with the safe space needed to
183
develop emotion regulation. “Attachment to a primary caregiver is
essential to the development of emotional security and social
184
conscience.”
During the preschool years, the child’s major developmental
tasks include growing her curiosity, self-direction, and selfmanagement, as well as building her self-confidence and social
185
Research shows that children’s attachment relationships
skills.
186
contribute to their success in meeting these benchmarks.
Attachment relationships affect children’s ability to interact with
187
188
unfamiliar people, their memory processes, their understanding
189
190
of emotion, their understanding of friendship, their conscience
Quality of Attachment and Behavior Problems in Preschool in a High-Risk
Sample, 50 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV., Nos. 1–2, 1985, at 147;
Douglas M. Teti et al., And Baby Makes Four: Predictors of Attachment Security
Among Preschool-Age Firstborns During the Transition to Siblinghood, 67
CHILD DEV. 579 (1996).
180. LAURA E. BERK, INFANTS AND CHILDREN 277 (5th ed. 2005).
181. See SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 87–88 (discussing the caregiver’s
interaction with infants as a behavioral organizational system).
182. See NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 229–30.
183. See SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 106–07.
184. Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption, and Dependent Care, Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics, Developmental Issues for Young Children in Foster Care, 106
PEDIATRICS 1145, 1146 (2000) [hereinafter Young Children in Foster Care].
185. These tasks are directly related to the self-regulation and social
competence essential for autonomous functioning in society.
186. See generally Marvin & Britner, supra note 173, at 55–62 (discussing
the development of attachment during the toddler and preschool years).
187. See Ross A. Thompson, Empathy and Its Origins in Early Development,
in INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTION IN EARLY ONTOGENY 144,
144–45 (Stein Bråten ed., 1998).
188. See Jay Belsky et al., Infant Attachment Security and AffectiveCognitive Information Processing at Age 3, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 111–14 (1996).
189. Deborah J. Laible & Ross A. Thompson, Attachment and Emotional
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development,
and their reactivity to stressful situations.
Additionally, the early attachment relationship also serves as a
prototype for relationships developed with others beyond the
immediate family as the child’s social circle widens, and for later
193
social relationships.
Attachment relationships are vital for the maturing child, not
only in the early years, but throughout development. Attachment
relationships with parents underlie the child’s ability to emerge
from the intimacy of the family to seek additional social
194
Research demonstrates that rather than opposing
relationships.
adolescents’ need to establish autonomy, as one might expect, the
parental-attachment relationship plays a vital role in helping
195
Attachment
adolescents successfully meet this challenge.
relationships with parents contribute to adolescents’ self-esteem,
social competence, emotional adjustment, behavioral self-control,
196
and sense of identity. The importance of attachment relationships

Understanding in Preschool Children, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1038,
1038–44 (1998).
190. Kathryn A. Park & Everett Waters, Security of Attachment and
Preschool Friendships, 60 CHILD DEV. 1076, 1076–80 (1989).
191. Grazyna Kochanska, Multiple Pathways to Conscience for Children with
Different Temperaments: From Toddlerhood to Age 5, 33 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 228, 236–39 (1997).
192. Megan R. Gunnar et al., Stress Reactivity and Attachment Security, 29
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 191, 200–02 (1996).
193. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 236. The attachment
relationship is also related to the child’s competence in elementary school,
including success with peers and academic abilities. Research shows that
attachment is related to overall academic performance in elementary school,
achievement test scores, attentiveness in school, and emotional health. See
SROUFE ET AL., supra note 172, at 163–65. In fact, throughout childhood,
attachment relationships are consistently related to functioning across social,
emotional, and cognitive domains. For example, a large-scale research study
following children and their attachment relationships over thirty years
concluded that a healthy attachment was positively related to all measures of
competence for fifteen-year-olds, including ratings of leadership, planning, selfconfidence, and social skills—all capacities related to autonomous functioning.
Id. at 179–82.
194. NEWMAN & NEWMAN, supra note 138, at 156.
195. Joseph P. Allen & Deborah Land, Attachment in Adolescence, in
HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 112, at 319, 319; see also Joseph P. Allen
et al., Longitudinal Assessment of Autonomy and Relatedness in AdolescentFamily Interactions as Predictors of Adolescent Ego Development and SelfEsteem, 65 CHILD DEV. 179, 181–92 (1994) (studying the importance of
establishing autonomy and relatedness in adolescent-family interactions); R.
Chris Fraley & Keith E. Davis, Attachment Formation and Transfer in Young
Adults’ Close Friendships and Romantic Relationships, 4 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS
131, 132–33 (1997).
196. See Consuelo Arbona & Thomas G. Power, Parental Attachment, SelfEsteem, and Antisocial Behaviors Among African American, European
American, and Mexican American Adolescents, 50 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 40,
40 (2003); Maureen E. Kenny & Kenneth G. Rice, Attachment to Parents and
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with parents continues into the college years and beyond. College
students’ attachment to their parents relates to their academic
performance and their social and psychological adjustment during
197
The attachment relationship with
the transition to college.
parents serves as a model for other relationships as young adults
establish their own lives, affecting their ability to successfully form
close relationships both with romantic partners and with friends
198
after leaving home.
Attachment relationships also “buffer young children against
the development of serious behavior problems, in part by
strengthening the human connections and providing the structure
199
This
and monitoring that curb violent or aggressive tendencies.”
200
Attachment relationships
remains true throughout childhood.
201
thus form “the cornerstone for healthy psychological adjustment.”
D.

The Need for Stability in Attachment Relationships

Disruptions in attachment relationships—and in particular
repeated disruptions—cause profound emotional and psychological
202
Disruption causes children to “not only suffer separation
harm.
distress and anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of their next
203
Displacing children’s
attachments, which will be less trustful.”
attachment relationships upsets the continuity of caregiving, which
usually provides the consistent, enduring environmental input,
Adjustment in Late Adolescent College Students: Current Status, Applications,
and Future Considerations, 23 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 433, 433–39 (1995).
197. See Simon Larose et al., Attachment State of Mind, Learning
Dispositions, and Academic Performance During the College Transition, 41
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 281, 283 (2005).
198. Miri Scharf et al., Adolescents’ Attachment Representations and
Developmental Tasks in Emerging Adulthood, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
430, 439–41 (2004).
199. NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 265.
200. For example, research studies have confirmed that family closeness and
attachment relationships are the most important factors associated with teens’
choices to not smoke, to use less alcohol and other drugs, to delay sexual
activity, and to forego suicide attempts. See generally Michael D. Resnick et al.,
Protecting Adolescents from Harm: Findings from the National Longitudinal
Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823 (1997).
201. DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT TO ADOPTION 13
(1998).
202. This harm is evidenced by changes in brain functioning. The stress
caused by disruptions of attachment has enduring effects on the regulation of
the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (“HPA”) axis of the brain. The HPA axis is
associated with the regulation of cortisol and is responsible for regulating the
body’s response to stress and for transmitting neurochemical information for
the processes of the sympathetic nervous system, the system that maintains
homeostasis in the body and directs the flight-or-fight response that might be
necessary for immediate survival. See James R. Corbin, Reactive Attachment
Disorder: A Biopsychosocial Disturbance of Attachment, 24 CHILD ADOLESC. SOC.
WORK J. 539, 539–44 (2007).
203. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 128, at 33.
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modeling, and support necessary for the child’s emotional, social,
204
and cognitive abilities to fully develop. Thus, “repeated ‘detaching’
and ‘re-attaching’ to people who matter . . . can lead to enduring
205
Ultimately, interference with children’s attachment
problems.”
relationships can lead to “aggression, fearful relationships, academic
206
As the
problems in school, and . . . elevated psychopathology.”
American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV confirms, repeated
changes in caregivers is related to a child’s inability to respond
appropriately to social situations, hypervigilance, excessive fear or
207
Courts also
withdrawal, and disinhibited behavior with adults.
have repeatedly noted the long-term psychological harm caused by
208
frequent disruption of parent-child attachments.
Because parent-child attachment relationships are so critical to
a child’s cognitive, emotional, social, and psychological development,
and because disruption of those attachment relationships
(particularly repeated disruption) impairs the child’s ability to form
future attachments, children need “sustained, reliable relationships
204. See generally Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
“Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental
Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
205. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 4.
206. Ana H. Marty et al., Supporting Secure Parent-Child Attachments: The
Role of the Non-Parental Caregiver, 175 EARLY CHILDHOOD DEV. & CARE 271,
274 (2005).
207. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 118 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Children with
reactive attachment disorder, a psychopathology related to attachment
disruptions, exhibit a range of severe behavioral disturbances, including
tantrums, intentional destruction of property, age-inappropriate sexual acting
out, physical aggression toward other children or adults, profanity, sociopathic
tendencies, toileting accidents, lack of empathy, inability to learn from
mistakes, stunted moral development, need for immediate gratification,
inability to self-soothe, and significant antisocial or violent behaviors. See
Steven R. Shaw & Doris Paez, Reactive Attachment Disorder: Recognition,
Action, and Considerations for School Social Workers, 29 CHILD. & SCH. 69, 69–
71 (2007). For further discussion of behaviors resulting from attachment
difficulties, see Charles H. Zeanah, Jr. & Anna T. Smyke, Attachment
Disorders, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 421, 421–27 (Charles H.
Zeanah, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2009). Reactive attachment disorder is caused by
“pathogenic caregiving,” defined in the DSM-IV as “(1) persistent disregard of a
child’s basic emotional needs for comfort, stimulation and affection; (2)
persistent disregard for the child’s basic physical needs; [or] (3) repeated
changes of primary caregiver that prevent the formation of stable attachments.”
DSM-IV, supra, at 118.
208. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 986 (D.D.C. 1991),
aff’d sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(“Prolonged stays in foster care and frequent changes in placements lead to
[psychological] disorders . . . all too frequently.”); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State,
81 P.3d 851, 854 & n.1 (Wash. 2003) (noting that frequent movement of children
in foster care “may create or exacerbate existing psychological conditions,
notably reactive attachment disorder”).
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209

within the family.” “Paramount in the lives of . . . children is their
210
need for continuity with their primary attachment figures . . . .”
The child’s need for a secure and stable family relationship is
211
Florida’s
the foundation of every state’s child welfare policies.
statutory declarations of policy are typical. They acknowledge that
foster care “often fails to meet the needs of children” in part because
212
children are “repeatedly placed” and “lack a stable environment.”
And they explicitly articulate the goals that “permanent placement
with the biological or adoptive family [be] achieved as soon as
possible for every child in foster care and that no child remain[] in
213
foster care longer than 1 year.”
Similarly, the Florida Adoption Act states that its overarching
purpose is “to provide to all children who can benefit by it a
214
The Act declares that “[t]he state has a
permanent family life.”
compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children in a prompt manner,” and that “[a]doptive
children have the right to permanence and stability in adoptive
215
The policy in favor of permanent and stable
placements.”
placements is so fundamental that it has been held to trump even
the desire to maintain beneficial relationships with grandparents,
216
which cannot be secured when a child is adopted.
As these typical declarations of public policy demonstrate, the
states have concluded that secure and stable family relationships
are of fundamental importance to the well-being of children. That
conclusion is unassailable: as the science confirms, these
217
relationships are “vital in the formation of the person.”
III. THE PARENTLESS CHILD’S RIGHT TO A PERMANENT FAMILY
Given the critical importance of a secure and stable family
218
relationship to a child’s healthy development and well-being, as
209. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 3.
210. Young Children in Foster Care, supra note 184, at 1145.
211. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8) (2010) (“The Legislature
recognizes that the best interests of the child require that the child be placed in
the most permanent living arrangement as soon as is practicably possible.”).
The universality of such policies can be explained in part by the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which requires
states accepting adoption subsidies from the federal government to report in
detail how well their child welfare systems achieve permanent placements for
children entering foster care. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(1)–(6) (2006).
212. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(1)(a)1, (1)(b) (2009).
213. Id. § 39.001(1)(h).
214. Id. § 63.022(3).
215. Id. § 63.022(1)(a), (c).
216. See G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 983 (Fla. 2008).
217. See Sroufe, supra note 177, at 365.
218. By this, we mean an enduring relationship with a primary caregiver
that is expected to be life-long. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. We
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well as its crucial role in enabling a child to achieve the essential
skills of self-regulation and social competence and to form a sense of
his own identity, children have a fundamental constitutional right to
219
a secure and stable family relationship.
We start from first principles. “[T]he protection of liberty under
the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental
220
At the very core
significance in defining the rights of the person.”
of this protected liberty is “an autonomy of self that includes
221
“[T]he ability
freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”
independently to define one’s identity . . . is central to any concept of
222
“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
liberty.”
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
223
of human life.”
Because “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
224
the Supreme Court has long accorded constitutional
State,”
protection to family relationships, not only safeguarding existing
225
relationships from intrusion, but also preventing the erection of
226
barriers to their formation. There is a “private realm of family life
227
which the state cannot enter.” “The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
do not claim that children are constitutionally entitled to a “secure” attachment
relationship as that term is used in the psychological literature. See supra note
138 and accompanying text (describing different categories of attachment
relationships).
219. As explained in Part I, courts have not yet addressed the argument
presented here. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) and Lofton v. Secretary of the Florida
Department of Children & Families, 358 F.3d 804, 811–15 (11th Cir. 2004), the
claims asserted were fundamentally different and focused on whether
temporary foster care arrangements were entitled to constitutional protection
from disruption. Adoption of X.X.G. declared Florida’s categorical ban on gay
adoption invalid on other grounds without reaching the argument presented
here, see supra notes 6 and 77, and Cox v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) was brought by two adults
who did not purport to assert any claim on behalf of adoptive children.
220. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). State constitutions also
provide substantive protection for the individual’s interest in liberty. The
Florida Constitution, for example, has been construed to protect “the right to
liberty and self-determination,” State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004),
and its explicit right of privacy, found in Article I, Section 23, provides even
“more protection than the federal right.” Id.
221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
222. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (emphasis added).
223. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
224. Id.
225. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
226. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–91 (1978).
227. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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228

additional obligations.”
“[I]n the culture and traditions of the
Nation” it is families that assume a primary role in “cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity
and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
229
In short, family relationships are critical to the
the State.”
independent formation of one’s core beliefs and ideals, and receive
constitutional protection in order to safeguard the freedom of self230
definition that is “central to any concept of liberty.”
Additionally, “[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve
231
and their constitutional
deep attachments and commitments,”
protection “reflects the realization that individuals draw much of
232
It is
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”
through family attachments that most of us find meaning and
fulfillment. The importance of family relationships in this respect
233
provides part of the justification for their constitutional protection.
On both grounds—its importance to a child’s independent selfdefinition and its importance to a child’s emotional well-being—the
child’s interest in a secure and stable family relationship warrants
234
As explained above, an attachment
constitutional protection.
228. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
229. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984); see also Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–
02 (1923) (noting that state-imposed collective rearing of children would do
“violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution”).
230. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
231. Id. at 619–20.
232. Id. at 619.
233. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (protecting the liberty
of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct because “the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (parent-child relationship is “far more
precious than any property right”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52
(1972) (describing the importance of family and familial bonds); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”);
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (explaining that the right to “marry, establish a home
and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) (marriage is “the
most . . . individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a
lifetime” and “of crucial significance to the individual’s happiness and wellbeing” (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.
2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991) (parent-child relationship is “sacrosanct”); Grissom v.
Dade Cnty., 293 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1974) (explaining that the right to establish
a family though procreation or adoption “is so basic as to be inseparable from
‘the right . . . to pursue happiness’” (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2)).
234. Of course, “[m]inors possess constitutional rights under both the federal
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relationship with a parent is critical to a child’s healthy cognitive,
emotional, social, and psychological development; it is essential to
the mastery of self-regulation and social competence; and it plays a
vital role in helping children “define who they are, what they can
235
become, and how and why they are important to other people.”
Without a parent figure to interact with and bond to, children lack
an essential source of feedback that they need to develop “the ability
236
In addition, the
independently to define [their own] identity.”
attachment to a parent figure that grows out of regular interaction
“is essential to the development of emotional security and social
237
and is “the cornerstone for healthy psychological
conscience,”
238
Because a secure and stable family relationship is
adjustment.”
essential to protect the child’s ability to form the attachments that
are critically important to identity development, self-regulation,
social competence, and emotional well-being, the child’s interest in a
secure and stable family relationship must be deemed a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION POLICY
Because the child’s interest in a secure and stable family
relationship is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, the
state must have a justification sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny
if it adopts laws or policies that interfere with the attainment of that
239
interest. In particular, in establishing its foster care and adoption
policies for parentless children, the state’s choices are significantly
constrained, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in
and Florida constitutions.” State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2004); see
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.
1989); Holmes, supra note 19, at 385–88 (collecting cases); David D. Meyer, The
Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1117, 1117–19 (2003) (describing widespread judicial recognition of children’s
claimed rights “in classic individual-versus-state conflicts”).
235. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1.
236. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
237. Young Children in Foster Care, supra note 184, at 1146.
238. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 201, at 13.
239. It is hornbook law that statutes that infringe a fundamental right
must withstand strict scrutiny to survive. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note
20, at 792. Some courts are emphatic that this is the applicable standard
whenever a fundamental right is implicated. See, e.g., J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109–
10 & n.3. But some scholars have argued that the Court has applied a
somewhat less demanding form of scrutiny in contexts where the interests of
family members are in tension and must be balanced. See David D. Meyer,
Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1125, 1163 (2001); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 527, 571–72 (2000) [hereinafter Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy].
Others have questioned the continuing vitality of the Court’s fundamental
rights/strict scrutiny doctrine in general. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in
the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
161, 172 (1984).
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240

Lofton.
To be sure, recognition of the child’s fundamental right to a
secure and stable family relationship does not require every law or
policy regulating foster care and adoption to pass strict scrutiny in
241
order to survive. Zablocki v. Redhail is instructive. There, the
Court struck down a statute restricting the ability of persons in
arrears on child support to marry, applying strict scrutiny on the
242
The Court disclaimed
basis that marriage is a fundamental right.
the view that “every state regulation which relates in any way
to . . . marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
243
legitimately be imposed.” But the statute at issue did significantly
interfere: those lacking the means necessary to cure their
delinquent support obligations were “absolutely prevented from
getting married,” and even for others, the statute’s requirements
were sufficiently burdensome to represent “a serious intrusion into
244
their freedom of choice.”
By the same token, the state is free to regulate foster care and
adoption in ways that do not significantly interfere with the
attainment of a permanent family relationship. For example,
regulations requiring an investigation and home study to confirm
that a proposed adoption is suitable and in the child’s best interest
would not appear to infringe the child’s right to a secure and stable
family relationship: even though they may delay the completion of
245
adoption proceedings, they help assure that the proposed adoption
246
will in fact provide the child with a permanent family.
In theory, a state could even decide to abolish adoption
altogether, so long as it vindicated the child’s right to a permanent
family relationship under a different legal rubric. From the child’s
perspective, attachments form regardless of biological or legal
247
While formal legal recognition of
connections with the caregiver.
240. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
241. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
242. Id. at 383–91. But see Meyer, supra note 19, at 915 & nn.132–33
(suggesting that the Court’s “ambiguous verbiage” in Zablocki signaled “a more
flexible form of scrutiny”).
243. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
244. Id. at 387.
245. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (holding that the delay in
obtaining divorce caused by a six-month residency requirement did not infringe
on the right to marriage).
246. Indeed, even with regulations requiring such an assessment, many
adoptive placements ultimately fail, and the parent returns the child to the
custody of the state. See Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 318 n.136 (reporting
that 10% to 25% of adoptions disrupt prior to finalization, and another 1% to
10% dissolve after the adoption is finalized).
247. For a general discussion related to this point, see St. Petersburg-USA
Orphanage Research Team, The Effects of Early Social-Emotional and
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248

including

Relationship Experience on the Development of Young Orphanage Children, 73
MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV., no. 3, 2008 at 1; see also GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 128, at 27; NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 106, at 234;
Susanne Bennett, Is There a Primary Mom?
Parental Perceptions of
Attachment Bond Hierarchies Within Lesbian Adoptive Families, 20 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 159, 161 (2003); Marty et al., supra note 206, at 271,
273.
248. Legal recognition of the parent-child relationship through adoption
enhances the child’s sense of security, belonging, and psychological well-being,
promoting a stronger sense of self and more favorable outcomes in terms of
personal, social, and economic functioning. See David D. Meyer, Family Ties:
Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
753, 798–803 (1999) (summarizing studies); John Triseliotis & Malcolm Hill,
Contrasting Adoption, Foster Care, and Residential Rearing, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 107, 111 (David M. Brodzinsky and Marshall D.
Schechter eds., 1990); John Triseliotis, Long-Term Foster Care or Adoption?
The Evidence Examined, 7 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 23, 31 (2002). In part this
can be explained by the legal significance of adoption: adopted children need not
worry that child welfare workers will intrude into their lives or take them away
from their home. See Meyer, supra, at 801 (noting the persistence of such fears
in foster children despite foster parents’ efforts to provide a sense of belonging
and security); Triseliotis, supra, at 28 (noting that the lack of legal security in
foster care creates a “continual state of anxiety” over possible termination of
placement).
In part, the explanation lies in the social and cultural significance of
adoption: adoption signifies (to the child and others) that the child “really”
belongs to and is part of the adoptive family. See Triseliotis & Hill, supra, at
113–15 (noting significant change in status perceived by children who were
adopted by their foster parents, who previously felt their “full family
membership” was “called into question in the eyes of outsiders”); Woodhouse,
supra note 19, at 323–24 (noting that “alternatives to adoption, even permanent
guardianship,” lack “the societal, cultural, and legal significance” of adoption,
which is perceived as providing “a ‘real’ home and a ‘real’ family”) (quoting
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 824 (11th
Cir. 2004)); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does
Legal Status Matter? Adoptions by Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 467–69
(2002) (suggesting that the social and legal status of adoption as contrasted
with that of foster care and kinship care explains the poorer outcomes for
children who are not adopted); Meyer, supra, at 806 (“Laws that give a child’s
caregivers the status of long-term custodians but deny them the status of
parents carry an explicit social meaning, that the caregivers are something less
than true parents to the child and that the living arrangement thus created is
something less than a true family.”).
In addition, the legal insecurity of foster parent relationships may cause
individuals to “hold back” in their commitment to and emotional investment in
those relationships, impairing the quality of bonding and attachment that
occurs. See Meyer, supra note 234, at 1125–26 (suggesting that “substantial
legal insecurity in the relationship between children and their adult
caregivers—at least when it relates to doubts about the continuity of custody or
future contact with the child—can impair the quality of bonding”); Meyer,
supra, at 798–802 (arguing from a variety of studies and sources that
“insecurity concerning the continuity of a loving relationship negatively affects
the bonding process between adult and child”); see also In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) (describing importance of the security provided by
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249

some that are of constitutional dimension, legal recognition is not
itself essential for the child’s development into an autonomous
250
adult. Rather, what matters is that the family relationships are in
251
Thus, for example, if children in
fact secure from disruption.
foster care were placed permanently with their foster family, and
the parents and children understood that the family relationships
were as a practical matter (if not legally) secure from disruption, the
child’s interest in a permanent family relationship likely would be
satisfied despite the absence of full legal recognition of the parent252
child relationship.

legal recognition of the marital relationship, enabling the spouses to rely on
each other’s commitment to the relationship and thereby enhancing their own
commitments and attachments to each other); Meyer, supra note 19, at 909
(“Marriage brings with it legal incidents and social norms that reinforce
commitment and encourage deeper investment by the participants.”).
249. Under legal regimes such as foster care and permanent guardianship
the state significantly intrudes into the family and deprives it of the autonomy,
permanence, and stability that legally recognized families possess. See G.S. v.
T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 984 (Fla. 2008). Such intrusion into family autonomy is
contrary to the “ideas . . . upon which our institutions rest.” Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); see also Meyer, supra note 19, at 895 (arguing that
second-class legal status selectively imposed on certain family relationships
implicates the constitutional right of family privacy). See generally supra notes
220–30 and accompanying text.
250. See Greg Kelly, The Survival of Long-Term Foster Care, in ISSUES IN
FOSTER CARE 12, 32 (Greg Kelly & Robbie Gilligan eds., 2002) (explaining that
children “have the opportunity to make satisfactory attachment relationships”
in foster care); see also Lauren Frey et al., Achieving Permanency for Youth in
Foster Care: Assessing and Strengthening Emotional Security, 13 CHILD & FAM.
SOC. WORK 218, 220 (2008) (noting that placement stability in foster care can
provide a sense of security and belonging, and encourage the development of
trusting relationships); Gillian Schofield & Mary Beek, Growing Up in Foster
Care: Providing a Secure Base Through Adolescence, 14 CHILD & FAM. SOC.
WORK 255, 259 (2009) (describing the ability of foster care to provide a secure
base for children through family membership, which typically requires support
into adulthood).
251. See Kelly, supra note 250, at 33; Janet Lahti, A Follow-Up Study of
Foster Children in Permanent Placements, 56 SOC. SERV. REV. 556, 567–68
(1982) (reporting higher child well-being scores “[w]here placements were seen
as permanent by the parents,” regardless of whether “the child was in legally
permanent placement . . . or in legally temporary foster care”).
252. However, it is difficult to conceive what legitimate purpose would be
served by relegating these children to such a second-class legal status. See
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding
that the prohibition of same-sex marriage furthers no legitimate governmental
purpose and violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment by imposing second-class legal status on same-sex
couples); see also Meyer, supra note 19, at 895 (arguing that second-class legal
status selectively imposed on certain family relationships implicates the
constitutional right of family privacy). Thus, while permanent foster care or
guardianship could theoretically satisfy the child’s interest in a secure and
stable family relationship, such a regime would implicate different
constitutional concerns.
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But the realities of foster care in the United States are quite
different. Nationwide, two-thirds of children in foster care for two
253
In
years or longer suffer repeated disruption of their placements.
Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi and Utah—the four states with
categorical restrictions on who may adopt—the record is far worse,
with as many as five out of six of these children experiencing three
254
255
Recent data show that for vast numbers of
or more placements.
children in foster care, the instability of placements is extreme:
131,652 children had five or more placements; 34,782 had ten or
256
Plainly, as even state
more; and 5034 had twenty or more.
legislatures have acknowledged, foster care “often fails to meet the
needs of children” because children are “repeatedly placed” and “lack
257
a stable environment.”
Given these realities of the foster care system, categorical
restrictions on the pool of adoptive parents significantly interfere
with the attainment of a permanent family relationship for
parentless children in the state’s care. By disqualifying a group of
adults from adopting regardless of their ability to parent, the system
253. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003–2006, at 29 tbl.V-1 (2010), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03-06/cwo03-06.pdf (reporting a
state-by-state median of only 32.1% with two or fewer placements).
254. See id. at 56 tbl.6.1 (reporting Arkansas data showing 82.6% of children
experiencing three or more placements); id. at 92 tbl.6.1 (reporting Florida data
showing 71.1% of children experiencing three or more placements); id. at 185
tbl.6.1 (reporting Mississippi data showing 66.9% of children experiencing three
or more placements); id. at 324 tbl.6.1 (reporting Utah data showing 85.2% of
children experiencing three or more placements).
255. NAT’L DATA ARCHIVE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, AFCARS DATA FOR
2007: DATASET NUMBER 143, at app. C, element 24 (2009). The data set forth
here were made available by the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and
Neglect, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and have been used with permission.
Data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System
(“AFCARS”) were originally collected by the Children’s Bureau. Funding for the
project was provided by the Children’s Bureau, Administration on Children,
Youth, and Families, Administration for Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The collector of the original data,
the funder, NDACAN, Cornell University, and their agents or employees bear
no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
Appendix C reports the data on the current foster care episode. Element
24 specifies how many different placement settings the child has experienced in
this foster care episode. The total number of children with data points on foster
placements was 782,984. The minimum number of placements reported in the
AFCARS data was one, and the maximum number was ninety-three. Using
SPSS (a statistical program used to analyze social and behavioral science data)
we calculated the number of the 782,984 children who had been in each
frequency of placement, ranging from one to ninety-three placements, and
derived the number of children with five or more placements (for example) by
summing the number of children at each data point between five and ninetythree placements.
256. Id.
257. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(1)(a)1, (1)(b) (2009).
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limits children’s opportunity to become part of a stable family. Like
the statute struck down in Zablocki, the categorical exclusions
mandated by the Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah
258
statutes impose an absolute legal bar to a child’s adoption when
the person otherwise eligible to adopt falls within the terms of the
259
Such restrictions therefore must have some compelling
statute.
260
justification to pass constitutional muster.
258. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
259. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304(a) (2009) (“A minor may not be
adopted . . . if the individual seeking to adopt . . . is cohabiting with a sexual
partner outside of a marriage that is valid under the Arkansas Constitution and
the laws of this state.”); FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2009) (“No person eligible to
adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2010) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A child may
not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a
legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”).
260. No such justification exists, at least from the standpoint of child welfare
concerns. First, gay people and straight people make equally good parents. See
Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families:
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?, 14 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 164,
175 (2010); Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian
Family Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents, 126
PEDIATRICS 28, 34 (2010); see also Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n. as Amicus
Curae Supporting Appellee at 13–20, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v.
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G. 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 3D083044), available at http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/xxg-nrg.pdf
(collecting studies regarding the suitability of gay and straight people as
parents); Adoption and Co-Parenting of Children by Same-Sex Couples: Position
Statement, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2002), http://www.psych.org/Departments
/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/PositionStatements
/200214.aspx (“Numerous studies over the last three decades consistently
demonstrate that children raised by gay or lesbian parents exhibit the same
level of emotional, cognitive, social, and sexual functioning as children raised by
heterosexual parents.”). The exclusions imposed by the Florida and Mississippi
statutes are thus factually insupportable on child welfare grounds.
Second, even if there were genuine child welfare concerns that some in the
excluded groups were not fit parents, categorically excluding everyone in those
groups is not narrowly tailored to address those concerns. Cf. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972) (explaining that even if “most unmarried
fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents,” the state may not categorically
deem them unfit, since “some are wholly suited to have custody of their
children”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1965) (holding that the state
may not categorically deem service members to be nonresidents when it is
feasible to assess residency on an individualized basis). Indeed, all four states’
categorical exclusions exist in the context of a regulatory regime that requires
individual screening, and that mandates that the child’s best interest be the
court’s paramount concern. See ARK CODE ANN. § 9-9-214(c) (2009) (authorizing
issuance of adoption decree only if “the court determines that . . . the adoption is
in the best interest of the individual to be adopted”); FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2)
(2009) (“[I]n every adoption, the best interest of the child should govern and be
of foremost concern in the court’s determination.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-11
(2010) (requiring home study to determine whether the petitioners are suitable
parents for the child and whether the proposed adoption is in the child’s best
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Similarly, in light of the extensive period of time many children
261
remain in foster care, laws or policies preventing the formation of
parent-child attachments in foster care would merit strict scrutiny.
For example, if a state decided to provide foster care solely in
262
faceless institutional settings, or to regularly move children from
263
home to home in order to prevent the formation of attachments,
the policy would implicate the child’s fundamental right to a secure
and stable family relationship.
V. RECONCILING PARENTAL RIGHTS WITH THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO A
PERMANENT PARENT
A number of objections might be raised to recognition of a
child’s substantive due process right to a permanent family
relationship. First, it could be asserted that any constitutional
interest a child has in a family relationship necessarily mirrors the
corresponding liberty interest of the parent, and so need not be
264
Second, given that the law
given separate recognition or analysis.
historically did not recognize an independent right of a child to
265
establish or maintain a family relationship, it could be argued that

interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that the
primary concern of the court in adoption cases is the best interest of the child).
In such a context, the categorical exclusion effectively instructs the court to
disregard the child’s best interest in cases where the categorical exclusion
applies. That instruction necessarily fails to promote child welfare concerns,
unless every person so excluded would not be a fit parent.
261. Nationwide, about 60% of the children entering foster care for the first
time remain in foster care twelve months or longer. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
supra note 253, at 19 tbl.IV-1. For those who are ultimately adopted, the
median length of stay in foster care prior to adoption is more than two and a
half years. Id. at 23 tbl.IV-4.
262. Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (upholding the temporary
confinement of unaccompanied children awaiting deportation in institutions
meeting minimal constitutional standards). Even in institutional settings,
attachments can form where the caregiving environment is deliberately
structured not to be “faceless” but to foster relationships between a child and
specific caregivers. See St. Petersburg-USA Orphanage Research Team, supra
note 247, at 235–38.
263. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
836 n.40, 838 n.41 (1977) (describing then-existing New York policy of moving
children in foster care to prevent the formation of emotional attachments); Doe
ex rel. Johanns v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (challenging a system of “overnight” foster care placements).
264. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
811–12, 814 (11th Cir. 2004).
265. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1043–50 (1992);
see also Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 803–05
(explaining that “the constitutional personhood and rights-bearing status of
children” was not “firmly established” until “after World War II”). But see id. at
799–807 (arguing that a child’s right not to be placed with unfit parents is
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no substantive due process right of a child to a permanent family
relationship can exist, because such a right finds no footing in the
266
Third, to the extent that
history and traditions of our nation.
recognition of this right is extended to contexts in which a
conflicting right of a parent is present, it could be argued that
recognition of the child’s right would undermine the constitutional
267
protection of parental authority and family autonomy.
A. Does a Child’s Constitutional Interest in a Family Relationship
Merely Mirror the Parent’s?
Courts sometimes fail to give full consideration to claims
asserted on behalf of children seeking constitutional protection of
their family relationships, asserting summarily that the child’s
268
For example, in
interest merely mirrors the claim of the parent.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., a plurality of the Supreme Court analyzed
and rejected the substantive due process claim of the biological
nevertheless sufficiently “rooted in our traditions” to be recognized as a
substantive due process right).
266. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997);
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion); United States v. FloresVillar, 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-5801).
267. This concern was central to the Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.: “Here, to provide protection to [the child’s relationship with her] adulterous
natural father is to deny protection to [her] marital father [in directing her
upbringing], and vice versa.” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion);
see also Smith, 431 U.S. 846–47 (suggesting that a child’s constitutional rights
may be “substantially attenuated” when they conflict with constitutional rights
of parents).
268. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion); Lofton, 358
F.3d at 811–12, 814. However, as David D. Meyer has noted, numerous court
decisions have upheld claims that “children possess their own constitutional
rights to maintain important family relationships.” Meyer, supra note 234, at
1119. Indeed, some courts have robustly asserted the independence of the
child’s constitutional interests from the parent’s. See, e.g., In re Jasmon O., 878
P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994) (“Children are not simply chattels belonging to the
parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge from the
interests of the parent.”); Oldfield v. Benavidez, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172 (N.M.
1994) (“Although parents have certain rights regarding their children, the
children also have certain fundamental rights which often compete with the
parents’ interests.”); In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 201 P.3d 169, 173–74
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 203 P.3d 102 (N.M. 2009) (affirming a
guardianship order giving custody of a child to long-term caregivers over a fit
parent’s objection and noting that the child “is herself a ‘person’ for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment”); Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138, 159 (W.
Va. 2005) (“A child has rights, too, some of which are of a constitutional
magnitude.”). See generally Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child’s Right to Protection
from Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 41 (1995) (asserting that children in contested adoption cases have
independent constitutional rights, including a right to protect existing
relationships with nonbiological parents and a right to be free from stateimposed psychological or emotional harm).
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father to maintain a relationship with his daughter, and then
disposed of the daughter’s claim by stating simply that her claim
was “the obverse” of her father’s and “fail[ed] for the same
269
reasons.”
This is error, for at least two separate reasons. First, the child’s
interest and the parent’s interest in a parent-child relationship are
270
For the parent, the right to “establish a
analytically distinct.
home and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of
271
happiness” in part because of the meaning and sense of fulfillment
272
It is doubtful that children typically
it gives to the parent’s life.
273
draw the same sense of fulfillment from teaching their parents.
On the other hand, “[t]here is good reason . . . to think that the
consequences for relationship disruption are not identical for
274
children and adults,” and that those consequences may well be far
275
On a variety of grounds, then, the
more significant for children.
child’s interest in the relationship is distinct from that of the parent,
276
and therefore requires separate analysis.
Second, regardless of whether the child’s interest in a family
relationship mirrors the parent’s, children in state custody have an
additional constitutional claim under Youngberg that the parent
lacks. That claim, we have argued, requires the state to provide at
least minimally adequate nurturing to the children in its care, in
order to vindicate their liberty interests in healthy development into
277
Thus, regardless of whether the constitution
autonomous adults.
protects the family relationships of foster parents and foster
children, for example, the parentless child in state custody has a
constitutional claim that stands on its own footing and merits
269. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion).
270. In other contexts, the Court has rejected such an identity of interests,
refusing to conclude, for example, that because parents have a fundamental
right to procreate, a developing fetus has a corresponding fundamental right to
be born. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–59 (1973).
271. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
272. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
273. But see CROSBY, STILLS, NASH & YOUNG, Teach Your Children, on DÉJÀ
VU (Atlantic Records 1970) (suggesting the child’s parallel role in passing along
values and beliefs to parents).
274. Meyer, supra note 234, at 1128.
275. See supra Part II.D.
276. In addition to the distinctions elaborated above, a child’s reasonable
expectations as to the permanence of a relationship may well be different from
those of a parent who is on notice of the state’s right to terminate it. See Fla.
Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 98
n.19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (Salter, J., concurring); see also Holmes, supra
note 19, at 383 (critiquing the “parent-centered” nature of courts’ analyses of
liberty interests in child-parent relationships for “overlook[ing] any liberty
interest the child may have”); Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 319–20 (critiquing
courts’ treatment of a child’s right to be adopted as the mirror image of an
adult’s right to adopt).
277. See supra Part I.A.
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independent analysis. It is wrong, therefore, for courts to dispose of
the child’s claims by asserting that those claims merely mirror the
claims of the parent.
B. Does Substantive Due Process Protect Only Narrowly Defined
Liberty Interests that Are Deeply Rooted in the Nation’s History and
Traditions?
The recognition of children as persons capable of having
cognizable constitutional and legal rights is a relatively recent
278
development in the law. Accordingly, some courts have summarily
rejected substantive due process claims asserted on behalf of
children, relying on a theory that only those narrowly defined liberty
interests that are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
traditions can receive protection under the doctrine of substantive
279
To be sure, Washington v. Glucksberg does suggest
due process.
that any asserted substantive due process right must be “carefully
descri[bed]” and be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
280
Justice Scalia has maintained the even more
traditions.”
restrictive view that the doctrine extends only to those rights—
described at “the most specific level” of generality—that are so
281
But a majority of the Court has expressly
rooted in tradition.
282
repudiated that view, and even the formulation in Glucksberg is
hard to reconcile with a host of decisions ranging from Loving v.

278. See Woodhouse, supra note 265, at 1043–50; see also Dwyer, A
Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 805 (explaining that “the
constitutional personhood and rights-bearing status of children” was not “firmly
established” until “after World War II”).
279. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1989) (plurality
opinion); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-5801).
280. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
281. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127–28 n.6 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that
the proper due process inquiry is whether legal traditions protected parental
rights of an adulterous natural father, not whether legal traditions protected
parental rights of natural fathers in general).
282. See id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I concur in all but footnote 6
of Justice Scalia’s opinion. This footnote sketches a mode of historical
analysis . . . that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this
area.”); id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I do not agree with
Justice Scalia’s analysis.”); id. at 137–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
plurality’s interpretive method is more than novel; it is misguided.”); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848
(1992) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the
outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth
Amendment protects.”).
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Virginia to Lawrence v. Texas.
As numerous scholars have noted, the Court’s substantive due
process decisions generally follow one of two distinct patterns of
analysis. Either the Court emphasizes the nation’s history and
traditions, or the Court grounds its analysis on the importance to
the individual of the particular liberty interest in question, as
285
As David Meyer
balanced against society’s legitimate concerns.
has suggested, “the Court emphasizes the importance of historical
consensus when it wishes to deny constitutional protection and
286
downplays it when it is otherwise inclined to extend protection.”
Thus, the historical legal status of children should not prevent the
287
At
recognition of their right to a permanent family relationship.
least for parentless children in the state’s custody, that right follows
directly from Youngberg v. Romeo and the Court’s numerous
substantive due process decisions protecting intimate family
288
relationships.
C. Would Recognition of the Child’s Right to a Permanent Family
Relationship Undermine the Constitutional Protection of the Family?
All children, not just those without parents, need a permanent
family relationship. If the law recognizes a constitutional claim of
children without parents to such a relationship, the question arises
whether that right also should be recognized for children with
parents.
Potentially, recognition of the child’s constitutional claim in
contexts where it is in tension with the rights of a parent could have
far-reaching consequences. For example, it could be claimed that
the child’s constitutional interest in a relationship with the parent is
sufficient to require the parent to undergo unwanted life-saving
medical treatment, or to prohibit the parent from relocating in the
289
One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that
context of divorce.
the constitutional rights of newborn children trump the interests of
their natural parents and can justify the state in taking them at
283. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
284. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893,
1921–25 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence marks Glucksberg “as a failed bid by
Chief Justice Rehnquist to curb the reach of substantive due process”).
285. See, e.g., Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 798–99;
Meyer, supra note 234, at 1122–23.
286. Meyer, supra note 234, at 1124; see also Meyer, The Paradox of Family
Privacy, supra note 239, at 562–63.
287. See Meyer, supra note 234, at 1124; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579
(“As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”).
288. See supra Parts I.A & III.
289. See Binder, supra note 12, at 1174–75 (suggesting that a child’s
relationship interests should be taken into account and be balanced against the
parent’s autonomy interests in these contexts).
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290

birth and giving them to adoptive parents.
Whatever one thinks of these possible outcomes, serious
objections could be raised if the child’s right to a permanent parent
were extended to contexts in which it conflicts with a parent’s
rights. As Mark Brown has argued, “Extending rights to children
that are independent of the rights of their parents invites extensive
291
That
governmental intervention into existing family units.”
intervention might undermine the effort and commitment parents
292
bring to the parent-child relationship, and diminish the quality of
293
Moreover, as Emily Buss has noted,
parent-child attachments.
children cannot assert their own rights; some adult must stand as
294
Thus, where those
surrogate to assert the child’s rights for her.
rights stand in tension with the rights of a parent, the pragmatic
effect of recognizing them is to substitute another surrogate for the
parent, and there is no reason to think other surrogates will do a
295
better job in protecting the child’s interests than a parent would.
At a minimum, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform makes it clear that the constitutional claims of a
child are attenuated when they conflict with the rights of a natural
296
parent. And, as noted in Troxel v. Granville, it may interfere with
the parent’s fundamental right to family integrity even to give a
297
child legal standing to assert a claim. We believe that exploration
of this complex subject is an appropriate matter for further

290. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 19, at 835. For a more
comprehensive exposition of Dwyer’s views, see generally DWYER, supra note 19.
291. Mark R. Brown, Closing the Crusade: A Brief Response to Professor
Woodhouse, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 331, 333 (2005); see also Margaret F. Brinig,
Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733, 764–65 (2001);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1100 (2003). But see Holmes, supra note 19, at 405
(suggesting that recognition of a child’s interest in preserving attachment
relationships need not interfere with parental rights of custody).
292. See Brinig, supra note 291, at 765 (“Granting rights to third parties
disrupts the intimacy and autonomy necessary for families—marriages and
children—to thrive.”); Scott, supra note 291, at 1080, 1097 (arguing that legal
regulation interfering with parental authority and discretion “makes the job of
being a parent less rewarding” and “diminishes [parents’] investment in the
relationship”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2414 (1995).
293. See Meyer, supra note 234, at 1125 (suggesting that “[f]or many
parents . . . immunity from second-guessing . . . may be an essential incentive to
their full and unqualified investment in the hard work of parenting,” which in
turn “may be vitally important to the bonding of parent and child”).
294. Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights?: Why Less Is More, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101, 1104 (2003).
295. Id.
296. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
846–47 (1977).
297. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 101
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Buss, supra note 294, at 1107, 1115.
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consideration.
Accordingly, at present we limit our claims to
299
contexts in which no competing right of a parent exists.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that children in state custody have a
substantive liberty interest in a secure and stable family
relationship, because such a relationship is essential in order for
these children to attain the capacities needed to function as
autonomous adults. Without an enduring attachment to a primary
caregiver, children are not likely to achieve the self-regulation and
social competence necessary to function as autonomous adults, nor
will they receive the essential feedback they need to develop a sense
of “who they are, what they can become, and how and why they are
300
A secure and stable family
important to other people.”
relationship is therefore a component of the minimally adequate
nurturing that the state is constitutionally obligated to provide to
parentless children in its custody, and this constitutional obligation
constrains the state’s choices in establishing its foster care and
adoption policies. In particular, given the unstable placements that
typify foster care in the United States, laws and regulations that
categorically disqualify a class of people from adopting work a direct
and substantial interference with the child’s right to a secure and
stable family relationship, and therefore must survive strict scrutiny
in order to pass muster. However, careful thought is needed before
the child’s right is extended to contexts in which it conflicts with the
rights of a parent.

298. See generally Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s
Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1979) (proposing four
categories of children’s rights and describing claimed rights against parents as
presenting “the most controversial and the most complex questions”);
Symposium, The Relationship Rights of Children, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
843 (2003).
299. As several scholars have noted, not all claims for the recognition of
children’s rights stand on an equal footing: those which demand that the state
respect a fundamental interest of the child do not generate the same objections
as those which make the same demand of a parent. See Meyer, supra note 234,
at 1117–19 (describing different judicial reactions to children’s claimed rights
“in classic individual-versus-state conflicts” as distinguished from conflicts
posing a challenge “to the authority of parents”); Wald, supra note 298, at 270
(contrasting a claim that a school “should not be able to dictate to children and
their parents the length of children’s hair” with a claim that children should
have a legally enforceable right against their parents “not to cut their hair if
their parents want it cut”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights
Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 332–
39 (1996) (criticizing efforts to infuse “rights” into parent-child relationships but
suggesting that rights of children against the state should be recognized).
300. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 130, at 1.

